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1078 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
INTRODUCTION
The Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA) regulates mutual funds
and other pooled investment devices.1 To understand how a mutual fund
works, suppose Jordan Belfort from The Wolf of Wall Street is released
from prison after serving his sentence for defrauding investors.2 During 
his time in prison, Jordan determined that his new purpose in life was to 
invest people’s money safely and efficiently though the use of mutual
funds. While Jordan was incarcerated, Chester, Donnie, and Nicky were
busy making sizeable salaries.3 Jordan proposes that Chester, Donnie, and
Nicky should pool their assets into a common fund and allow Jordan to
manage the fund for a management fee.4 According to the proposal,
Chester, Donnie, and Nicky will receive tradable shares in the pooled fund
proportional to their investments.5 Jordan further emphasizes the 
advantages that pooling assets into a common fund produces and that
individual investors cannot achieve alone: lower administrative costs
through economies of scale, professional portfolio management, and
reduced risk through a more diversified investment portfolio.6 
Specifically, Jordan proposes the use of a mutual fund with himself as the
investment adviser. Mutual funds are “pooled investment vehicles” that
fall within the scope of ICA regulation.7 Furthermore, because Jordan is a
mutual fund investment adviser, the ICA regulates his behavior.8 Jordan’s
main role as investment adviser is fund management.9 
1. Mark Holland et al., Investment Company Act Circuit Split Exposes
Mutual Funds, LAW360 (Aug. 26, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.law360.com
/articles/1192402/investment-company-act-circuit-split-exposes-mutual-funds
[https://perma.cc/2TH9-2YK8].
2. Jordan Belfort was the founder of the investment firm Stratton Oakmont.
Belfort and the firm scammed investors using a variety of wrongful tactics. The
movie The Wolf of Wall Street encapsulates Belfort’s wrongful investing tactics 
and his loose lifestyle. THE WOLF OF WALL STREET (Paramount Pictures 2013).
This hypothetical does not consider the ramifications of re-certification of
investment advisers after conviction for defrauding investors.
3. Chester, Donnie, and Nicky are three characters, loosely based on real
individuals, who helped Jordan Belfort build Stratton Oakmont. Id.
4. See, e.g., Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036,
1040 (9th Cir. 2015).
5. See, e.g., id.
6. See, e.g., id.
7. Holland et al., supra note 1.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–1 (2019).
9. Northstar, 779 F.3d at 1040.
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2021] COMMENT 1079
Chester, Donnie, and Nicky needed some convincing, so Jordan
produced the mutual fund prospectus.10 The prospectus indicates a
conservative strategy with modest, long-term objectives. The prospectus
shows the diverse range of securities within the Standard and Poor’s 500
(S&P 500) that the fund will invest in.11 The prospectus indicates Jordan’s 
salary will be calculated based on the overall performance of the mutual
fund. The prospectus convinces Chester, Donnie, and Nicky to invest in
the mutual fund under Jordan’s leadership. While managing the fund,
Jordan reminisces about his days at Stratton Oakmont and realizes he has
an opportunity to further his own financial position if he invests his client’s
funds in high-risk, high-reward penny stocks.12 Because Jordan’s salary is
linked to the performance of the fund, the faster the mutual fund grows,
the more money he will make. The growth rate of the S&P 500 stocks
pales in comparison to the possible growth of a successful penny stock.13 
Jordan selects new penny stocks he believes are bound to appreciate in
value, and, unbeknownst to the investors, he sells the mutual fund’s S&P
500 stocks and purchases the risky penny stocks. Unfortunately for Jordan
and the investors, the penny stocks become worthless within a few days of
Jordan’s risky move. Jordan directly violated the terms of the prospectus
when he invested in the risky penny stocks. The investors believed they
were investing in a relatively safe, conservative fund; however, Jordan
exposed the investors to excessive risk through his self-motivated
investment tactics. Chester, Donnie, and Nicky have lost substantial
amounts of their life savings because of the self-serving actions of their
investment adviser. Certain sections of the ICA may provide the
unsuspecting investors with a private right of action against the fund and
10. The prospectus is the legally binding contract between the fund and the
fund holder. Shauna Carther Heyford, Digging Deeper: The Mutual Fund
Prospectus, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund
/04/032404.asp [https://perma.cc/GEB9-AZ6F] (last updated May 17, 2019).
11. The S&P 500 is an index that tracks the top 500 stocks as determined by
total market capitalization. Will Kenton, S&P 500 Index – Standard & Poor’s 500
Index, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sp500.asp [https:
//perma.cc/Q5TL-ZWNU] (last updated Sept. 8, 2020).
12. Stratton Oakmont was the investment company Jordan Belfort founded.
He used the company to defraud investors. THE WOLF OF WALL STREET, supra
note 2.
13. Chris B. Murphy, Penny Stock, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investoped
ia.com/terms/p/pennystock.asp [https://perma.cc/8RW4-MAXH] (last updated
Nov. 17, 2020).
352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd  408 4/26/21  8:53 AM






     
      
   
    
    
    
  
   
   
   
 
  
     
   
    




      
   
    
   
  
 
   
 
      
    
      
   
   
      
     
 
    
    
    
    
      
   
1080 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Jordan, its adviser; however, the current state of the law makes their ability
to recover unclear.14 
Section 47(b)(2) of the ICA may provide the remedy the investors
need to recover from Jordan.15 Section 47 states that if the terms of an
investment contract or the performance thereof violate another section of
the ICA, “a court may not deny rescission” to any party to the contract.16 
Courts disagree about whether § 47(b)(2) creates a private right of action
for rescission of investment contracts.17 For example, in Santomenno ex
rel. John Hancock Trust v. John Hancock Life Insurance, the Third Circuit
found there was no private right of action for rescission under § 47(b)(2).18 
Conversely, in Oxford University Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC, the
Second Circuit held that a private right of action for rescission exists under
§ 47(b)(2).19 
Although Oxford recognized the existence of a private right of action
for rescission, the court denied rescission to the plaintiffs.20 The Oxford
court presented sound reasoning in support of its conclusion that a private
right of action for rescission exists under § 47(b)(2); however, because the 
court failed to grant rescission, it is unclear what circumstances are 
required to recognize such a right.21 The uncertainty surrounding the
Oxford decision has caused concern among investment companies because
a private right of action for rescission poses an increased risk of litigation, 
and, if rescission is granted, it poses a risk to their financial stability.22 As
expressed in the findings and declaration of policy section of the ICA, 
investment companies are vital to the health of the U.S. economy.23 
Congressional policymaking should balance investors’ rights with
American citizens’ interest in a stable U.S. economy. With these
competing interests in mind, a private right of action for rescission exists
under § 47(b)(2) when a contract violates or causes a violation of another
14. See Holland et al., supra note 1.
15. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46(b)(2) (2019).
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46. Investment advisers’ breach of the fiduciary duty
they owe to investors of investment companies is a violation of the ICA for which
plaintiffs may seek rescission. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–35(a).
17. See Oxford Univ. Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC, 933 F.3d 99 (2d Cir.
2019); Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Tr. v. John Hancock Life Ins., 677 F.3d
178 (3d Cir. 2012).
18. Santomenno, 677 F.3d 178.
19. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d 99.
20. Id. at 109.
21. See generally Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d 99.
22. See Holland et al., supra note 1.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–1 (2019).
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2021] COMMENT 1081
section of the ICA, and courts should recognize such a right.24 The 
language of § 47(b)(2) evinces a clear legislative intent to provide a private
right of action for rescission.25 Furthermore, Senate and House committee
reports produced when Congress amended the ICA in both 1970 and 1980
support a private right of action for rescission under § 47(b)(2).26 Although
a private right of action for rescission exists under § 47(b)(2), the
principles of standing, judicial discretion (as provided for in § 47(b)(2)), 
and severability (as provided for in § 47(b)(3)) limit the negative financial
effects that recognizing such a private right of action could produce for the
investment company industry.27 Courts should consider these restraints
when presented with cases seeking rescission of investment contracts
under § 47(b).
Part I of this Comment will discuss the provisions of the ICA that are 
relevant to private rights of action for rescission. Part I will further discuss
the statutory scheme of the ICA and the history of judicial recognition of
private rights of action under the ICA. Next, Part II will present the current
circuit split regarding private rights of action under § 47(b)(2).
Specifically, Part II will analyze both Santomenno and Oxford.28 Part III
will argue that a private right of action does exist under § 47(b)(2);
however, the right of action is limited because of principles of standing,
judicial discretion, and severability. Finally, Part IV will conclude that a
private right of action for rescission under § 47(b)(2) is consistent with the
ICA’s statutory scheme, especially considering the limitations of the
private right of action.
I. THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT: AN OVERVIEW AND JUDICIAL 
HISTORY
Congress enacted the ICA in response to pervasive fraud and
mismanagement in the investment company industry throughout the
1930s.29 The findings and declaration of policy section expresses the 
24. See generally Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d 99.
25. Id. at 105.
26. S. REP. NO. 91-184 (1970); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1341, at 29 (1980).
27. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a–46.
28. Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Tr. v. John Hancock Life Ins., 677 F.3d
178 (3d Cir. 2012); Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d 99.
29. H. Norman Knickle, The Investment Company Act of 1940: SEC
Enforcement and Private Actions, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 777, 778
(2004). The ICA defines an “investment company” as an entity that is or holds
itself out to be mainly engaged in investing, reinvesting, or trading securities.
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1082 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
objectives of the ICA.30 This section indicates that the regulation of
investment companies is of national importance because investment
companies are a popular avenue for private investment in the U.S.
economy.31 Furthermore, as a popular avenue for private investment,
investment companies tremendously affect the flow of savings to the
national economy.32 
The findings and declaration of policy section further elaborates that
the influence of investment companies is so vast that the national public
interest and the interest of investors are negatively impacted when
investment companies fail to fairly present information regarding the
nature of their investment vehicles; when the directors, officers,
investment advisers, and others affiliated with such people invest funds in
their own self-interest or the interest of other third parties; or when funds
are invested with excessive risk such as the use of pyramiding to invest
funds.33 In response to these issues, the ICA requires investment
companies to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and to provide the SEC and their customers with financial
information.34 Furthermore, the ICA addresses the significant role of fund 
directors and regulates conflicts of interest and fiduciary duties.35 
Congress recognized that many of the abuses in the mutual fund
industry arise because of the unique relationship between investment
advisers and the funds they manage.36 Specifically, Senate Report Number
184 manifests this understanding:
A typical fund is organized by its investment adviser which
Companies that issue face-amount installment certificates and companies with
assets comprised of more than 40% investment securities are also considered
investment companies. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–3.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–1.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Pyramiding occurs when an investor buys shares of stock in a 
company containing options to buy additional stock at a predetermined price.
When the shares of stock increase in value, the investor sells some of the stock
and uses the funds to purchase stock at the option price contained in the remaining
shares of the same company. The process can be undertaken to slightly increase
the number of shares in a company that an investor has, so long as the price of the
stock increases. Will Kenton, Pyramiding, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.invest
opedia.com/terms/p/pyramiding.asp [https://perma.cc/F8JF-F7XX] (last updated
Feb. 26, 2018).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–8; id. § 80a–29.
35. Knickle, supra note 29, at 783.
36. See Lessler v. Little, 857 F.2d 866, 870 (1st Cir. 1988).
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2021] COMMENT 1083
provides it with almost all management services. . . . [A] mutual
fund cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the
adviser. Therefore, the forces of arm’s-length bargaining do not
work in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as they do 
in other sectors of the American economy.37 
Consider the relationship between advisers and mutual funds the ICA 
targets in the context of the Jordan Belfort example.38 Jordan Belfort
performs all of the managerial services for the fund, such as choosing
which securities to invest in and when to do so. As the investment adviser
for the fund, Jordan owes his investors a fiduciary duty, or a duty to act in 
their best interest.39 Juxtaposed to Jordan’s fiduciary duty is the idea that
Chester, Donnie, and Nicky are poorly positioned to sever their investment
relationship with Jordan if Jordan goes rogue and acts against their best
interest. If they fire Jordan, they have lost the person with the knowledge
to invest their money properly. Congress enacted the ICA in light of this
conflict of interest as well as reports of investment advisers victimizing
security holders.40 
The ICA has undergone two series of amendments since its enactment
in 1940.41 Congress first amended the ICA in 1970 when it divided § 36 
into subsections (a) and (b).42 Subsection (a) contemplates a breach of the
fiduciary duty relating to the personal misconduct of investment
advisers.43 Subsection (b) imputes a fiduciary duty on investment advisers
regarding the fees they charge for their services, and it also provides an
explicit private right of action for breach of the fiduciary duty when fees
are excessive.44 Congress amended the ICA for the second time in 1980.45 
The 1980 amendment divided § 47(b) into two paragraphs.46 Section 
47(b)(2) states if the terms of an investment contract or the performance
thereof violate another section of the ICA, “a court may not deny
rescission at the instance of any party.”47 Whether § 47(b)(2) provides a 
37. S. REP. NO. 184, at 5 (1969).
38. See supra Introduction.
39. See Fiduciary Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
40. See Lessler, 857 F.2d at 870.
41. See Knickle, supra note 29.
42. Id. at 818–19.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–35 (2019).
44. Id.
45. See id. § 80a–46 (1980).
46. See id. § 80a–46 (2019).
47. See id.
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1084 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
private right of action for rescission depends heavily on judicial
interpretation of other private rights of action under the ICA.
A. A History of Private Rights of Action under the ICA
Throughout the ICA’s 80-year existence, courts often faced the issue
of enforcement authority.48 The most obvious conclusion was that the SEC
had the power to enforce the ICA given the express authority to do so
contained in § 42.49 Under § 42, the SEC can file suit against violators of 
the ICA for both injunctions and monetary penalties.50 Currently, only one
section of the ICA, § 36(b), explicitly provides for a private right of
action.51 Congress created § 36(b) in 1970 amid rising instances of
investment advisers and fund directors breaching the fiduciary duty they
owed to investors.52 Section 36(b) gives private security holders an explicit
right of action for breaches of the fiduciary duty regarding excessive fees
paid to investment advisers.53 For 30 years following the 1970
amendments, courts generally found implied private rights of action under
various sections of the ICA.54 
Although § 36 was not amended to explicitly provide a private right
of action until 1970, several federal appellate courts decided cases 
regarding whether implied private rights of action existed under the ICA
before that time.55 The reasoning used in the pre-1970 cases is
foundational to the current-day circuit split.56 In 1961, the U.S. Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals became the first federal appellate court to decide
whether the ICA supported implied private rights of action.57 In Brouk v.
Managed Funds Inc., the plaintiffs sued investment company directors,
alleging the directors operated the fund in the interest of the directors, not
48. See generally Oxford Univ. Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC, 933 F.3d 99
(2d Cir. 2019); Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Tr. v. John Hancock Life Ins.,
677 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2012); Jacobs v. Bremner, 378 F. Supp. 2d 861 (N.D. Ill.
2005); Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961); Brown v.
Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 422 (2d Cir. 1961).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–41.
50. Santomenno, 677 F.3d at 187; Brown, 294 F.2d at 422.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–35.
52. Knickle, supra note 29, at 814–15.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–35. Note in § 36(c) the term “investment adviser”
includes trustees who perform the function of an investment adviser.
54. Knickle, supra note 29, at 814–15.
55. See Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961); Brown, 
294 F.2d 415.
56. Knickle, supra note 29, at 813–16.
57. Id. at 814–15 (citing Brouk, 286 F.2d at 918).
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2021] COMMENT 1085
the security holders.58 The directors published incomplete and false 
financial statements, derogated from the fund’s fundamental investment
policy, and allowed individuals to act as investment advisers without a
written contract approved by the shareholders.59 The court ruled that a
private right of action required “manifest legislative intent.”60 Essentially,
private rights of action required clear congressional authorization; thus,
without an express grant by Congress, the court found the plaintiffs had
no right of action.61 Later that year, in Brown v. Bullock, the Second Circuit
rejected the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit when it held that several
sections of the ICA supported private rights of action.62 
The contradictory conclusions of the Second and Eighth Circuits in
Brown and Brouk hinged on whether the courts applied the doctrine of
implied liability.63 The doctrine of implied liability states that the lack of
an express provision for civil liability is not enough to overcome the
implications of the overall law, so long as the implications are within the
purview of the general purpose of the legislation.64 The Second Circuit
applied the doctrine, whereas the Eighth Circuit did not.65 The doctrine of
implied liability that guided the courts in previous years is similar to the
reasoning used in the current circuit split regarding implied rights of action
under the ICA.66 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran embodies the
reasoning courts used to find implied rights of action under federal
legislation absent express statutory authorization.67 In Curran, the
Supreme Court interpreted federal legislation by considering the
“contemporary legal context” in which Congress acted.68 Under the
contemporary-legal-context theory, courts examined “Congress’
perception of the law that it was shaping or reshaping.”69 The theory
58. Brouk, 286 F.2d at 918.
59. Id. The allegations constitute violations of § 80a–1(b)(2), § 80a–33,
§ 80a–13, and § 80a–15(a), respectively.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See generally id.; Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 422 (2d Cir. 1961).
63. Knickle, supra note 29, at 815.
64. Id. at 815–16 (citing Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.
Pa. 1946)).
65. See generally Brouk, 286 F.2d at 918.
66. Knickle, supra note 29, at 816.
67. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353
(1982).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 378.
352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd  414 4/26/21  8:53 AM







   
    
 
 
   
 
   
   
  
 
    
   






   
    
    
 
   
    
   
          
  
   
    
 





     
   
     
    
1086 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
presents two alternatives depending on whether Congress creates a new
statute or amends an old statute under which courts have established an
implied private right of action.70 When Congress enacts new legislation, a
court must determine if Congress intended the legislation to supplement
pre-existing, express provisions of private enforcement.71 When Congress 
acts in a judicial context where courts have recognized an implied private
right of action based on an existing statute, the question is whether
Congress intended to preserve that implied right of action.72 When
Congress amended the ICA in 1970 and again in 1980, it acted within a 
judicial context in which a number of courts already recognized implied
private rights of action under several sections of the ICA; therefore, the
question courts should ask when interpreting the ICA is whether Congress
intended to preserve previously existing implied rights of action.73 
Furthermore, Fogel v. Chestnutt exemplifies the line of reasoning
courts used to find private rights of action under the ICA after the 1970
amendments using the contemporary-legal-context theory.74 In Fogel, the 
Second Circuit found an implied private right of action under § 36(a) when
an investment adviser and a fund director breached their fiduciary duties.75 
Though § 36(b) contains an express private right of action, the court held
that this did not preclude a finding of implied rights under other sections.76 
The court reasoned that Congress added § 36(b) in response to the 
judiciary’s failure to interpret the ICA in such a way as to remedy the
wrongs the act was intended to address.77 The court opined that when 
§ 36(b) was enacted, investment companies charged adviser fees as a
70. Id.
71. Id. at 378–79.
72. Id. 
73. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 96-1341, at 29 (1980); S. REP. NO. 91-184 
(1970). The importance of courts recognizing implied private rights of action
under several sections of the ICA is that the court decisions represent a microcosm
of how the judiciary as a whole was interpreting the ICA at the time. The judicial 
interpretation of current congressional statutes provides Congress with the 
information it needs to determine whether the rights of action currently recognized
are consistent with congressional intent. Presumably, if Congress wants the 
judiciary to continue to acknowledge a private right of action under a particular
statutory scheme or section of a statute, then it will draft legislation accordingly.
For such an assertion to be accurate, it is necessary for a majority of courts to act 
with relative consistency.
74. Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 1981).
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 417 (2d Cir. 1975)).
77. Id. at 111–12.
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2021] COMMENT 1087
percentage of the market value of managed assets.78 In Fogel, the fees were
reasonable when the fund was established; however, they became
excessive as the fund grew.79 The court explained that the judicially
recognized implied private right of action in place prior to the enactment
of § 36(b) forced private plaintiffs to show gross misconduct on the part
of the investment adviser—a threshold rarely, if ever, met.80 With the high
threshold in mind, the SEC proposed a bill that would have required
reasonable adviser’s fees.81 The court reasoned that the SEC did not intend
amendments made pursuant to the proposed bill to preclude implied
private rights of action under other sections of the ICA, as the various
amicus curiae briefs that the SEC submitted supported implied private 
rights of action.82 The court distinguished § 36(a) from § 36(b).83 The 
express private right of action in § 36(b) addressed breaches of fiduciary
duty regarding investment adviser fees, while § 36(a), which imputes a
general fiduciary duty on the investment fund and its officers, contains an
implied private right of action.84 Although the Fogel court rendered its
decision a year before Curran, the Fogel court applied the contemporary-
legal-context theory when it concluded that Congress was acting in a
judicial context where courts had previously recognized implied private
rights of action.85 The court recognized that Congress intended to preserve
the pre-existing implied right of action under § 36(a) even though
Congress created an express right of action under § 36(b).86 
The contemporary-legal-context theory first developed in Curran and
applied to § 36 of the ICA in Fogel is integral for understanding § 47(b).87 
The current version of § 47 was a product of the 1980 amendments to the
ICA.88 Prior to the 1980 amendments, § 47(b) voided all contracts that 








85. See generally id. at 111. See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378–79 (1982).
86. See generally Fogel, 668 F.2d at 111. See also Curran, 456 U.S. at 378– 
79.
87. See generally Curran, 456 U.S. 353; Fogel, 668 F.2d 100.
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46 (2019).
89. Id.
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1088 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
bifurcated § 47(b) into paragraphs (1) and (2).90 Paragraph (1) states that
if the terms of the investment contract or the performance thereof violates
another section of the ICA, the contract is “unenforceable by either
party.”91 Paragraph (2) references performed or partially performed
contracts containing terms that violate the ICA or the performance of
which violates the ICA and states that “a court may not deny rescission [of
such contracts] at the instance of any party.”92 Following the 1980
amendments, the Third Circuit in Bancroft Convertible Fund v. Zico
Investment Holdings, Inc. provided the specific contemporary legal
context in which Congress enacted the 1980 amendments.93 
In Bancroft, the Third Circuit held that § 12(d)(1)(A) of the ICA
contains an implied private right of action.94 Section 12(d)(1)(A) precludes
investment companies from purchasing more than 3% of the voting shares
of another investment company.95 The court held that the judiciary 
consistently found implied rights of action under the ICA; therefore,
Congress acted within a “contemporary judicial context” when it amended
the ICA in 1980.96 The court reasoned that in House committee reports 
from the 1980 amendments, Congress acknowledged the judicial context
that it was working within as follows: “the Committee wishes to make
plain that it expects the courts to imply private rights of action under
[securities laws], where the plaintiff falls within the class of persons
protected by the statutory provision in question.”97 
The Bancroft court emphasized that implied private rights of action
are consistent with and further Congress’ intent.98 The Bancroft court used 
the contemporary-legal-context theory and the reasoning from Fogel when 
it held § 12(d)(1)(A) supported a private right of action.99 
Within several months of the Third Circuit’s Bancroft decision, the




93. Bancroft Convertible Fund, Inc. v. Zico Inv. Holdings, Inc., 825 F.2d 731,
734 (3d Cir. 1987).
94. Id. at 733–36.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–12.
96. Bancroft, 825 F.2d at 734 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982)).
97. Id. at 735.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Lessler v. Little, 857 F.2d 866 (1st Cir. 1988).
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2021] COMMENT 1089
included an implied private right of action.101 Section 17(a)(2) prohibits 
investment advisers and their affiliates from knowingly purchasing assets
of a registered investment company.102 The plaintiff, Lessler, brought a
class action suit on behalf of all shareholders of the Narragansett
investment company.103 The plaintiff sued Narragansett and its officers 
and directors for rescission of a sales contract under which Narragansett
was sold to Monarch Capital Corporation.104 The sales contract included a 
retention of “Management Company,” the company Narragansett used as
its investment adviser.105 Management Company was Narragansett’s
investment adviser; consequently, § 17(a)(2) precluded Management
Company from knowingly purchasing Narragansett securities.106 The sales
contract violated § 17(a)(2) because it gave Management Company a 20%
interest in the profits of Narragansett.107 The plaintiffs sought rescission of
the sales contract under § 47(b) based on the violation of § 17(a)(2).108 The 
court found that the sales contract violated § 17(a)(2); however, the court
denied rescission under § 47(b).109 Although the ever-present conflict of
interest between a mutual fund and its investment adviser is squarely
within the purview of the ICA, the court denied rescission because the
investors lacked standing.110 The court opined that the investors lacked
standing because they were not parties to the sales contract; however, the 
court noted that the investors could acquire standing through a derivative
suit brought on behalf of Narragansett.111 Narragansett had standing 
because the company was a party to the illegal contract.112 Lessler
recognized yet another implied right of action under the ICA; furthermore,
the decision also emphasized the important restriction that standing places
on private rights of action for rescission under § 47(b).113 
101. Id. at 871–73.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–17 (2019).
103. Lessler, 857 F.2d at 868.
104. Id. at 867.
105. Id. at 868.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–2.
107. Lessler, 857 F.2d at 873.
108. Id. at 868.
109. Id. at 875.
110. Id. at 870, 875.
111. Id. at 875.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 866.
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1090 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
B. A Collective Shift in Thought—Denial of Private Rights of Action 
under the ICA
Since 2001, the jurisprudence has shifted away from finding private
rights of action under the ICA primarily because of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Alexander v. Sandoval.114 Sandoval did not directly address the 
ICA; however, the decision established valuable precedent for statutory
interpretation, which explains the general denial of private rights of action 
under the ICA since 2001.115 
In Sandoval, the plaintiff sued the Alabama Department of Public 
Safety, alleging a violation of the disparate-impact regulations enacted
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.116 The specific regulations
that the plaintiff referenced did not expressly provide for a private right of
action.117 The Court held that Congress must create a private right of
action; the judiciary cannot simply provide remedies as it sees fit.118 The
Court further stated that the statute must create both a private right and a
private remedy.119 The opinion expressed that the text and structure of a
statute are the primary factors of consideration to determine if a statute
grants a substantive right.120 The decision noted that statutes fail to create 
an implied intent to confer rights when the statute focuses on the entity
regulated and not the individuals protected.121 The Court held that a statute
expressly providing for one method of enforcement creates a presumption 
that Congress intended to preclude other methods of enforcement not
mentioned.122 Furthermore, the Court articulated that the presumption
created when another method of enforcement is provided is sometimes
strong enough to overcome congressional intent to create a private right of
action.123 For example, when a statute provides for federal agency
enforcement, there exists a presumption that a private right of action is
114. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
115. See generally id.
116. Id. at 278.
117. Id. at 292.
118. Id. (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).
119. Id. at 286 (citing Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 
444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979)).
120. Id. at 288.
121. Id. (citing California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981)).
122. Id. at 291 (citing Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps., 489 U.S. 527,
533 (1989)).
123. Id. at 290 (citing Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps., 489 U.S. 527,
533 (1989)).
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2021] COMMENT 1091
precluded.124 The opinion emphasized that the presumption created when
a statute provides for one method of enforcement may overcome
congressional intent to create a private right of action even when the
language of the statute makes the plaintiff a “member of the class for
whose benefit the statute was enacted.”125 The decision noted the various
lower courts that have denied private rights of action even when the statute
seemingly creates a private right of action because of the presumption that
exists when another method of enforcement is provided.126 
Moreover, congressional inaction in the face of judicial precedent
deserves very little consideration in the interpretive process because it is
impossible to determine if congressional inaction indicates approval of
judicial interpretation.127 The decision emphasized this notion when the
statutory amendments are isolated to particular sections of a statute as
opposed to sweeping overhauls of an entire statute.128 The Sandoval
decision seemingly signaled the death of implied private rights of action
in general.129 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON § 47(B)(2): AN IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF 
ACTION?
The circuit split between the Second and Third Circuits depends on
the courts’ interpretations of the text of § 47(b)(2) in light of the Sandoval
holding.130 In Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Trust v. John Hancock
Life Insurance Co., the Third Circuit found that § 47(b)(2) did not contain
rights-creating language; therefore, the statute did not provide a private
right of action for rescission.131 Conversely, in Oxford University Bank v. 
Lansuppe Feeder, LLC, the Second Circuit found that although § 47(b)(2)
did not contain an express private right of action, it did contain rights-
124. See id. at 291 (citing Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps., 489 U.S.
527, 533 (1989)).
125. Id. at 290.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 292 (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 175 (1989)).
128. Id. (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 (1989)).
129. See generally id. at 290.
130. See generally Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Tr. v. John Hancock Life
Ins., 677 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2012); Oxford Univ. Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC,
933 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2019).
131. Santomenno, 677 F.3d at 187.
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1092 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
creating language.132 Furthermore, the Oxford court opined that the
Sandoval decision allowed a court to find a private right of action so long 
as some textual evidence of one existed.133 
A. A Denial of a Private Right of Action under § 47(b)(2)
In Santomenno, the Third Circuit became the first federal appellate
court to rule on a private right of action for rescission under § 47(b)(2).134 
The plaintiffs were participants in an employer-sponsored 401(k) benefit
plan.135 The trustees of the plan entered into group annuity contracts with
John Hancock.136 The plaintiffs alleged John Hancock charged excessive
service fees for the management of the 401(k) plans in violation of
§ 36(b).137 Additionally, the plaintiffs sought rescission of their investment
contracts under § 47(b)(2) pursuant to a violation of § 26(f).138 Under
§ 26(f), fees charged under variable insurance contracts must be
reasonable and proportional to the services provided.139 
First, the court analyzed the section of the ICA the defendants
allegedly violated: § 26(f).140 The court held that § 26(f) does not expressly
provide for a private right of action for enforcement.141 The Third Circuit
applied the statutory interpretation precept from Sandoval that the
existence of one method of enforcement suggests congressional intent to 
preclude other methods of enforcement.142 The majority opined that § 42 
provided the SEC with broad power to enforce the ICA; therefore, it was
likely Congress intended to exclude a private right of action as an
alternative method of enforcement.143 
Thereafter, the court reasoned that since the § 26(f) claim failed, the 
§ 47(b)(2) rescission claim also failed because § 47(b)(2) does not create
a private right of action.144 The opinion emphasized that § 36(b)
132. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d 99.
133. Id.
134. See Santomenno, 677 F.3d 178.




139. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–25 (2019).
140. See Santomenno, 677 F.3d at 185.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–25.
142. Santomenno, 677 F.3d at 185; see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275 (2001).
143. Santomenno, 677 F.3d at 186.
144. Id. at 185–87.
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2021] COMMENT 1093
specifically enumerates a private right of action, while § 47(b)(2) lacks
such express language.145 The court reasoned that it was not likely 
Congress expressly included a private right of action in § 36(b) yet simply
“forgot to mention” a private right of action under § 47(b)(2).146 
Furthermore, the majority opined that because § 42 provides for SEC
enforcement, courts should be reluctant to read additional remedies into
the statutory scheme.147 Additionally, the court found that § 47(b)(2) did
not contain rights-creating language.148 Specifically, the court emphasized
the language used in § 47(b)(1): “a contract that is made, or whose
performance involves, a violation of this title . . . is unenforceable.”149 The
opinion stressed that the use of the word “unenforceable” as opposed to 
“void” as used in other securities regulation acts of the era indicated the
defensive nature of § 47(b).150 The court held that § 47(b) creates “a 
remedy rather than a distinct cause of action or basis of liability”;
therefore, the underlying section of the ICA that is violated must contain
rights-creating language.151 The court reasoned that since § 26(f) does not
contain rights-creating language because it focuses on the entity regulated
and not the individual protected, no right of action for rescission existed
under § 47(b)(2).152 
Although most courts since Sandoval have not found a private right of
action for rescission under § 47(b)(2), the United States District Court for
the Western District of Tennessee in In re Regions Morgan Keegan
Securities left the door open for the possibility of a private right of action
under § 47(b)(2).153 The plaintiffs were beneficiaries of a trust fund.154 The
fund manager invested the funds in riskier mutual funds than the
prospectus of the trust allowed, which caused the plaintiffs to suffer large
financial losses.155 The plaintiffs sued the trust fund manager, the mutual
fund in which the trust was invested, and the underwriters of the mutual
145. Id. at 186 (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290).
146. Id. (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979)).
147. Id. (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979)).
148. Id. at 178 (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46 (2019).
150. Santomenno, 677 F.3d at 187 (citing Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc.
(TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979)).
151. Id. (citing Stegall v. Ladner, 394 F. Supp. 2d 358, 378 (D. Mass. 2005)).
152. Id. at 186.
153. In re Regions Morgan Keegan Secs., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 743 F.
Supp. 2d 744 (W.D. Tenn. 2010).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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1094 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
fund.156 The investors sought rescission of the underwriting agreement.157 
The court held that the plaintiffs could not rescind the contract under
§ 47(b)(2) because they were not parties to the underwriting agreement.158 
Although the § 47(b)(2) claims were dismissed, the opinion cited a 
consistent line of jurisprudence indicating § 47(b) “contemplates a private
right of action.”159 Furthermore, the court noted § 47(b)(2) only 
contemplates derivative suits whereby a private plaintiff brings suit on
behalf of the company as a whole.160 The plaintiffs brought a personal suit
and not a derivative suit; therefore, the plaintiffs’ claim was prohibited.161 
In re Regions Morgan Keegan Securities planted the seed for a private
right of action for rescission under § 47(b)(2) if the plaintiffs are parties to
the contract and bring a derivative suit on behalf of all similarly situated
investors.162 
B. A Private Right of Action under § 47(b)(2)
In August of 2019, the Second Circuit derogated from the Third
Circuit’s holding in Santomenno when it decided Oxford University Bank
v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC.163 The Oxford court held that § 47(b)(2)
contained a private right of action for rescission.164 In the case, Lansuppe
LLC owned two-thirds of the senior notes in the Soloso trust.165 The
Soloso trust issued notes according to its indenture.166 The Soloso trust
156. Id.
157. Id. at 762.
158. Id. (citing Lessler v. Little, 857 F.2d. 866, 874 (1st Cir. 1988)).
159. Id. (citing Lessler v. Little, 857 F.2d. 866, 874 (1st Cir. 1988); Mathers
Fund, Inc. v. Colwell Co., 564 F.2d 780, 783 (7th Cir. 1977); Hamilton v. Allen,
396 F. Supp. 2d 545, 558–60 (E.D. Pa. 2005); In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F.




163. Oxford Univ. Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC, 933 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2019).
164. Id. at 109.
165. Id. at 102.
166. Id. “A trust indenture is the agreement in a bond contract made between
a bond issuer and a trustee that represents the bondholder’s interests . . . .” James
Chen, Trust Indenture, INVESTOPEDIA https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/
trust_indenture.asp [https://perma.cc/YR35-N5YP] (last updated Mar. 6, 2020).
The indenture establishes the rules and responsibilities each party owes the other.
Id.
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was a special purpose vehicle (SPV) used for investment purposes.167 As
an SPV, the trust sold its notes and bought trust preferred securities to 
collateralize and secure the notes.168 The interest earned on the trust
preferred securities paid noteholder interest.169 The trust contained several
tranches of noteholders, notably one tranche of senior noteholders and
several tranches of junior noteholders.170 In the event of liquidation, the 
trust entitled the senior noteholders to payment before junior
noteholders.171 When the Soloso trust failed to pay an interest payment to
senior noteholders, the trust indenture provided that the trust was in 
“default.”172 Per the indenture, default triggered several noteholder rights,
including the right of two-thirds of the senior noteholders to demand
liquidation of the trust assets.173 Pursuant to this provision, Lansuppe
initiated the trust instruction and ordered the trustee, Wells Fargo, to
liquidate the trust’s assets and distribute the proceeds as set forth in the
trust indenture.174 If the trust was liquidated per the trust’s indenture,
senior noteholders would be compensated; however, junior noteholders
would receive nothing.175 The junior noteholders objected to the
liquidation and alleged Soloso violated §§ 7 and 8 of the ICA, which
require investment companies to register with the SEC unless the issuer’s
notes are owned by “qualified purchasers” when acquired.176 The language
167. A special purpose vehicle is a company created by a parent company used
to isolate or secure assets in a separate company. James Chen, Special Purpose
Vehicle (SPV), INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/spv.asp
[https://perma.cc/4E9B-KTF3] (last updated June 29, 2020). It is often kept off
the balance sheet and is usually created to undertake riskier endeavors while the
parent company is protected. Id. In this particular case, the purpose of the SPV
was to secure debt so as to ensure investors received repayment. 
168. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 101.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 102. A tranche is a group of investment securities, each with a
unique amount of risk. James Chen, Tranches, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.invest
opedia.com/terms/t/tranches.asp [https://perma.cc/5LFJ-7HX9] (last updated
Nov. 27, 2020).




175. Id. at 101.
176. Id. at 103; 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a–6 to 7 (2019). “Qualified purchasers” include
individuals with at least $5 million in investments; a company with at least $5
million in investments owned by close family members; a trust, not formed for
the investment, with at least $5 million in investments; an investment manager
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1096 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
in Soloso’s indenture ensured non-qualified purchasers could not obtain the
notes.177 The indenture only allowed the trust to sell to qualified purchasers,
and transfers of trust securities could only be made to other qualified
purchasers.178 Despite the rules set forth in the trust indenture, qualified 
purchasers sold the Soloso notes to non-qualified purchasers, triggering the
violation of ICA registration requirements under §§ 7 and 8.179 
The Second Circuit acknowledged its previous decision in Bellikoff v.
Eaton Vance Corp., where it found no private right of action under a
different provision of the ICA.180 The court applied the same factors used 
in Bellikoff, yet concluded that § 47(b)(2) contained a private right of
action for rescission.181 The three Bellikoff factors were: (1) the absence or
presence of rights-creating language in the relevant section of the ICA; (2)
the explicit enforcement power provided to the SEC in § 42; and (3) the
presence of an express private right of action for violations of § 36(b).182 
The first factor assessed in both Bellikoff and Oxford was the presence
or absence of rights-creating language within the text of the section of the
ICA at issue.183 The Oxford court reasoned that the text of § 47(b) itself
clearly evinced Congress’ intent to provide a private right of action.184 The 
opinion compared § 47(b)(1) and (2) and found that paragraph (1) renders 
“unenforceable by either party” contracts or the performances thereof that
violate another section of the ICA;185 therefore, at the very least, a party
sued for nonperformance under such a contract can claim illegality as a
defense.186 Under § 47(b)(2), in relation to contracts that violate the ICA
as written or when performed, “a court may not deny rescission at the
instance of any party.”187 The court opined that § 47(b)(2) necessarily
presupposes that if a contract violates the ICA, a party to that contract can 
managing at least $25 million worth of assets; or a company with at least $25
million worth of investments. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–3(c).
177. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 102.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 103.
180. Bellikoff v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2007).
181. Id. at 115–18; Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 104–07.
182. Bellikoff, 481 F.3d at 115–18; Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 104–07.
183. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 104; Bellikoff, 481 F.3d at 116.
184. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 105.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46(b)(1) (2019).
186. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 105.
187. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46(b)) (emphasis added).
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2021] COMMENT 1097
seek rescission through a court action.188 Further, the opinion noted that
§ 47(b)(2) contains a “semi-express” private right of action.189 
The court’s analysis of the language within § 47(b)(2) turned on the
Sandoval axiom that statutes referencing a particular class of persons tend
to create rights.190 The majority in Oxford found that § 47(b)(2) addressed 
a particular class of persons who stand to benefit from a private right of
action—that is, any party to a contract that violates the ICA.191 The 
defendant’s argument that “any party” only referenced the SEC did not
persuade the court because the words “any party” indicate that more than
one party may seek rescission.192 The court opined that sections intended 
solely for SEC enforcement referenced enforcement by “the
Commission.”193 The opinion deduced that different verbiage necessarily
implies a party other than the SEC can enforce § 47.194 Furthermore, when
§ 47(b)(1) and (2) are read in conjunction with one another, paragraph (2)
provides the remedy for unenforceable contracts under paragraph (1).195 
The second and third factors the court addressed were the existence of
another means of enforcement in § 42 and the explicit private right of
action found in § 36(b).196 The Oxford court reasoned that the existence of
other mechanisms to enforce a statutory provision only “suggests”
Congress intended to preclude others.197 The court explained that the 
suggestion created by other enforcement mechanisms is overcome where, 
as in the case of § 47, the meaning of the text is clear.198 
In addition to refuting the Bellikoff factors, the Oxford court bolstered
its decision with jurisprudence finding an implied private right of action
under a similar section of the Investment Advisers Act (IAA), which is
considered “companion legislation” to the ICA.199 Following a line of
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 104; Bellikoff v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir.
2007); see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) (citing California v.
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981)).
191. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 105.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 106.
195. Id.
196. Id.; Bellikoff v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2007); 15
U.S.C. § 80a–41(2019).
197. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 106.
198. Id. at 101 (citing BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176
(2004)).
199. Id. at 106 (citing Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 
444 U.S. 11, (1979)).
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1098 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
cases finding private rights of action under similar IAA legislation,
Congress amended § 47(b) in 1980, indicating congressional approval of
courts finding rights of action under similar types of acts.200 The opinion
then expanded on the bifurcation of § 47 via the 1980 amendments.201 Prior
to the 1980 amendments, § 47 voided contracts made in violation of the
ICA; however, the 1980 amendments bifurcated such contracts into
unperformed and performed.202 Section 47(b)(1) indicates unperformed 
contracts in violation of the ICA cannot be enforced, whereas under
§ 47(b)(2), performed or partially performed contracts can be rescinded to
the extent they have been performed.203 In essence, § 47(b)(1) prevents 
parties to illegal contracts from seeking judicial enforcement of the
contract. Conversely, § 47(b)(2) contemplates rescission, which requires
repayment for partial performance and restoration of each party to their
respective precontractual positions.204 
Further support for a private right of action for rescission under
§ 47(b)(2) is found in congressional reports.205 Specifically, the Oxford
court cited the House committee report accompanying the 1980
amendments.206 The House committee report explicitly states, “[T]he 
Committee wishes to make plain that it expects the courts to imply private
rights of action under this legislation.”207 The opinion concluded that the
committee report shows that the contemporary legal context and the
legislative history of § 47(b) strongly support a private right of action for
rescission.208 
The Oxford court refuted the Santomenno decision when it reasoned
that the Third Circuit incorrectly reverted to canons of statutory
interpretation when the text of the statute was clear.209 Finally, the court
rejected several district court decisions which held that § 47(b) did not
create an implied private right of action because its language “contains a
200. Id.
201. Id. at 107.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Rescission, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
205. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1341, at 29 (1980).
206. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 107 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 96-1341, at 29 
(1980)). The 1980 amendments created the current iteration of § 47. See 15 U.S.C.
80a–46 (2019).
207. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 107 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 96-1341, at 29 
(1980)).
208. Id. at 108.
209. Id.
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2021] COMMENT 1099
remedy, but not a substantive right.”210 The Oxford court reasoned that if
no private right of action for rescission exists under § 47(b)(2), the section 
is effectively read out of the ICA.211 Courts concluding no right of action
for rescission exists under § 47(b)(2) ignore a central tenet of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sandoval: interpretation of statutes should center on
congressional intent found within the text of the statute.212 
Although the Oxford decision acknowledged a private right of action
for rescission under § 47(b)(2), the plaintiffs were denied rescission.213 
The plaintiffs contended the resale of the notes from qualified to non-
qualified purchasers violated the ICA and attempted to rescind the
indenture based on the illegality of the resale.214 The plaintiffs were parties
to the trust indenture they attempted to rescind; however, neither the terms
of the indenture nor its performance violated the ICA.215 In fact, the
language of the trust indenture ensured that non-qualified purchasers could
not purchase trust notes.216 Thus, the plaintiffs may have had a right of 
action to rescind the contracts between the qualified and non-qualified
purchasers because these contracts violated the ICA. However, the 
plaintiffs could not rescind the trust indenture because the indenture itself
did not violate the ICA.217 The court indicated that if the plaintiffs had
brought suit against the resellers of the notes for violating the ICA, then
the plaintiffs would have had a claim to rescind the sale contracts.218 
The Oxford decision exhibits convincing evidence of a private right of
action for rescission of investment contracts.219 The decision rebuts the
main arguments used to deny private rights of action under § 47(b)(2), and
it provides independent proof that a private right of action should exist.220 
Because the Oxford opinion recognized a private right of action for
rescission but failed to grant it, the opinion compounds the question
210. Id. (citing Smith v. Oppenheimer Funds Distrib., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d
511, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Smith v. Franklin/Templeton Distribs., Inc.,
No. C 09-4775, 2010 WL 2348644, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2010); Stegall v.
Ladner, 394 F. Supp. 2d 358, 378 (D. Mass. 2005).
211. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 108–09.
212. Id. at 109 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)).
213. Id.
213. Id. at 109–10.
214. Id. at 109.
215. Id. at 110.
216. Id. at 109.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 109–10.
219. See generally Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d 99.
220. See generally id.
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1100 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
addressed: if there is a private right of action for rescission under
§ 47(b)(2), when will it apply? 221
III: A LIMITED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER § 47(B)(2)
In Santomenno, the Third Circuit interpreted the statutory language of
§ 47(b) incorrectly, while in Oxford the Second Circuit interpreted the
statutory language correctly.222 The language of § 47(b) indicates a private
right of action exists, especially when the language is “buttressed”223 by 
the Senate and House committee reports relating to the 1970 and 1980
amendments to the ICA.224 In the wake of the Oxford decision, there was 
concern among lawyers specializing in investment company litigation that
a private right of action for rescission could result in increased litigation
expense and uncertainty in investment contracts.225 The risk posed to
investment companies also presents a risk to the United States’ economic
stability.226 
The risk associated with a private right of action for rescission,
however, is limited. Although there may be a slight increase in the amount
of litigation surrounding rescission of investment contracts under
§ 47(b)(2), the circumstances necessary for a plaintiff to bring suit limit
the risk of increased litigation expense.227 Standing requires the plaintiffs 
to be parties to the contract they seek to rescind or to bring a derivative
suit on behalf of the entire investment company if the investment company
itself entered into the contract with a third party.228 In addition, the
provisions of § 47 limit the economic harm that could result from a court’s
grant of rescission.229 Particularly, courts are given authority to deny
rescission on equity grounds under § 47(b)(2), and under § 47(b)(3), courts
must limit rescission to the portion of the contract that violates the ICA as
written or when performed to the extent the violative portion is
221. Id. at 109.
222. See generally Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Tr. v. John Hancock Life
Ins., 677 F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 2012); Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 109.
223. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001).
224. See generally Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d 99.
225. See generally Holland et al., supra note 1.
226. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 80a–1 (2019).
227. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992);
PRACTICAL LAW LITIGATION, DISTINGUISHING DIRECT FROM DERIVATIVE
CLAIMS (Dec. 15, 2018), Westlaw W-001-0268.
228. See generally Lujan, 504 U.S. 555; PRACTICAL LAW LITIGATION, supra
note 227.
229. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 80a–1.
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2021] COMMENT 1101
severable.230 While courts should recognize a private right of action for
rescission under § 47(b)(2), courts should also consider the limitations of
such a right created by standing, the equity provisions in § 47(b)(2), and
the severability clause in § 47(b)(3).231 
A. A Private Right of Action for Rescission Exists under § 47(b)(2)
Section 47(b)(2) creates a private right of action, as evidenced in the
language of the statute itself, and the “contemporary legal context”232 
“buttress[es]” the text of the statute.233 In Oxford, the court pointed to three 
factors the Second Circuit previously used in Bellikoff to deny other
private rights of action under the ICA.234 The considerations were: (1) the 
relevant section of the ICA did not contain “rights creating language”
because it did not confer rights on a particular class of persons;235 (2) § 42 
provided for SEC enforcement of the ICA;236 and (3) § 36(b) was the
exclusive private right of action under the ICA.237 
The Oxford court correctly found that “[t]he text of § 47(b)
unambiguously evinces Congressional intent to authorize a private
action.”238 Considering the tenets of statutory interpretation established in
Sandoval, a comparison of the language selected for § 47(b)(1) and (2) is
paramount.239 Section 47(b)(1) renders contracts that violate the ICA
“unenforceable by either party.”240 The language in § 47(b)(1) allows a
party to raise illegality of contract as a defense to a suit for failure to render
performance.241 To the contrary, § 47(b)(2) states that “a court may not
deny rescission at the instance of any party.”242 While paragraph (1) uses
230. See id. § 80a–46.
231. See id.
232. Oxford Univ. Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC, 933 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir.
2019).
232. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46.
233. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) (citing Thompson v.
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988)).
234. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 104.
235. Id. (citing Bellikoff v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir.
2007)).
236. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46.
237. See id.
238. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 105.
239. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288; 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46.
240. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 104 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46).
241. Id. at 105.
242. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46.
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1102 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
the term “unenforceable,” paragraph (2) uses “rescission.”243 According to
Black’s Law Dictionary, rescission can be used as a remedy or a
defense.244 Paragraph (1) uses the word “unenforceable,” indicating that
illegality can be used as a defense; therefore, the use of “rescission” in
paragraph (2) necessarily indicates an offensive remedial purpose of the
word “rescission.”245 If “rescission” is interpreted to have its defensive 
meaning, § 47(b)(2) would be meaningless in light of § 47(b)(1).246 
Additionally, § 47(b)(2) states, “[A] court may not deny rescission at
the instance of any party.”247 The use of the word “instance” is key.248 
According to Merriam-Webster, “instance” means “the institution and 
prosecution of a lawsuit” or an “instigation, request.”249 It follows that the
plain meaning of “instance” indicates a party can institute a lawsuit for
rescission of an investment contract that violates the ICA as written or as
performed.250 The language in § 47(b)(2) is “effectively equivalent to
providing an express cause of action.”251 Furthermore, § 47(b)(2) indicates
a particular party has the right to sue for rescission—any party to an illegal
contract.252 
The authority to enforce the ICA granted to the SEC in § 42 does not
preclude a private right of action under § 47(b)(2).253 Other methods of
enforcement only suggest congressional intent to preclude implied private 
rights of action.254 The text of § 47(b)(2) overcomes this suggestion
because the text clearly indicates a party to a contract made in violation of
or the performance of which violates the ICA can seek rescission.255 
Evidence surrounding the 1970 and 1980 amendments indicates that
Congress did not intend § 36(b) to be the exclusive private right of action
under the ICA.256 The 1970 amendment is relevant because it created the
243. Id.
244. Rescission, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
245. See Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 105.
246. See id. at 109.
247. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46 (emphasis added).
248. Id.
249. Instance, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dic
tionary/instance [https://perma.cc/YF29-9NHX] (last visited Dec. 20, 2020).
250. Id.
251. See S. REP. NO. 91-184 (1970); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1341, at 29 (1980).




255. Id. at 101 (citing BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176
(2004)).
256. See Knickle, supra note 29.
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2021] COMMENT 1103
express private right of action under § 36(b), while the 1980 amendment
is vital because Congress changed § 47(b) to include two paragraphs, (1)
and (2).257 Paragraph (1) speaks of unenforceability of violative contracts, 
while paragraph (2) speaks of rescission of violative contracts.258 
Congressional committee reports surrounding both amendments support
the premise that § 36(b)’s express private right of action was not intended
to preclude other private rights of action.259 
Pursuant to the 1970 amendments to the ICA, which created a private
right of action under § 36(b), the Senate committee report regarding the
amendments states that Congress did not enact § 36(b) to stop courts from
finding implied rights of action under other sections of the ICA.260 The
Senate committee report established unequivocal proof: Congress did not
intend § 36(b) to preclude other rights of action under other sections of the
ICA.261 Congress amended the ICA again in 1980.262 A House committee
report pertaining to the amendment states that “the Committee wishes to
make it plain that it expects the courts to imply private rights of action
under the legislation.”263 Congress did not intend to prevent courts from
finding private rights of action under either the amendment that created
§ 36(b)—the section courts rely upon to deny private rights of action in
other sections of the ICA—or the amendment that created the current
language of § 47(b).264 In fact, the reports acknowledge both that Congress
enacted legislation within a judicial context that included implied rights of
action under various sections of the ICA and that Congress did not intend
the addition of § 36 and the bifurcation of § 47 to block rights of action
under other sections of the ICA.265 
Although Sandoval held that it is impossible to extrapolate
congressional approval of judicial interpretation in light of isolated
amendments to legislation, the reasoning of the Sandoval Court is
257. Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 107.
258. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46 (2019).
259. See Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 107.
260. Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100, 111 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 96-1341, at 29 (1980)).
261. See S. REP. NO. 91-184 (1970).
262. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46.
263. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1341, at 29 (1980).
264. See Fogel, 668 F.2d at 111; Oxford Univ. Bank, 933 F.3d at 107.
265. See generally S. REP. NO. 91-184 (1970); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1341, at 29
(1980).
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1104 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
inapplicable to the 1970 and 1980 amendments to the ICA.266 The Senate
and House committee reports surrounding the 1970 and 1980 amendments
make it possible to determine that Congress approved of the judiciary’s
interpretation of the ICA.267 Both committee reports expressly state that
Congress intended courts to find private rights of action in sections of the
ICA other than § 36(b).268 Furthermore, the Sandoval decision did not
completely preclude the use of the contemporary-legal-context
principle.269 The Sandoval Court approved the use of contemporary-legal-
context theory when it “simply buttressed a conclusion independently
supported by the text of the statute.”270 Specifically, the Sandoval Court
opined, “We have never accorded dispositive weight to context shorn of
text. . . . [L]egal context matters only to the extent it clarifies text.”271 As
expressed above, the text of § 47(b)(2) clearly indicates congressional
intent to create a private right of action for rescission of contracts in
violation of the ICA.272 It follows that the use of the Senate and House
committee reports is acceptable to buttress the text supporting a private
right of action for rescission under § 47(b)(2).273 
B. Limits to the Private Right of Action under § 47(b)(2)
Although the scope of § 47(b)(2) is seemingly broad in that it provides
for a private right of action for rescission to any party to an illegal contract,
the risk posed to investment companies is relatively low.274 Standing 
requirements greatly reduce the instances under which private plaintiffs
can bring suit for rescission; therefore, the scope of potential plaintiffs is
reduced to those who are parties to the violative contract and those who 
266. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292 (2001) (quoting Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 (1989)). But see S. REP. NO. 91-184 
(1970); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1341, at 29 (1980).
267. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 292 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 (1989)). But see S. REP. NO. 91-184 (1970); H.R. REP.
NO. 96-1341, at 29 (1980).
268. See generally S. REP. NO. 91–184 (1970); H.R. REP. NO. 96–1341, at 29
(1980).
269. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290.
270. Id. at 288.
271. Id.
272. Oxford Univ. Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC, 933 F.3d 99, 105 (2d Cir.
2019).
273. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288.
274. See Holland et al., supra note 1.
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2021] COMMENT 1105
can bring derivative suits on behalf of all shareholders.275 Furthermore, the
equity provisions in § 47(b)(2) and the severability provision in § 47(b)(3) 
greatly reduce the risk of economic harm that could result from
rescission.276
1. Standing in General
Standing is a person’s right to seek relief in court.277 Standing ensures
that the plaintiff has a personal interest in the case and that the parties are
adversarial.278 There are two ways an investor may have standing to seek 
rescission under § 47(b)(2).279 First, an investor has standing if the
investment contract violates the ICA or if the performance of one of the
stipulations within the investment contract causes an ICA violation.280 If
the ICA violation arises from the investment contract, the investor can
bring a direct claim against the investment company, the investment
adviser, or the investment company’s board of directors.281 Second, an
investor has standing if the investor brings a derivative suit on behalf of
the investment company.282 Direct claims allege the defendants harmed
the individual shareholders, whereas derivative claims assert the
defendants harmed the company as a whole.283 The plaintiffs in a
derivative action bring the claim on behalf of the corporation when the
corporation refuses to bring suit or when demanding suit is futile.284 The 
law of the state under which an investment company is incorporated
determines whether a direct or a derivative suit must be brought.285 In most
states, jurisprudentially established standing rules require the plaintiff in a
direct action to have suffered harm distinct from the harms suffered by the
275. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992);
PRACTICAL LAW LITIGATION, supra note 227.
276. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46 (2019).
277. See generally Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Three criteria are needed to show
standing. First, there must exist an injury in fact to a legally protected interest.
The damage must be concrete and not speculative in nature. Second, a causal 
nexus between the alleged injury and the conduct of the defendant must exist. 
Finally, a favorable judgment must be likely to remedy the damage inflicted. Id.
278. Id.
279. See generally Oxford Univ. Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC, 933 F.3d 99
(2d Cir. 2019).
280. See generally id.
281. See generally Hamilton v. Allen, 396 F. Supp. 2d 545 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
282. See generally id.
283. PRACTICAL LAW LITIGATION, supra note 227.
284. Id.
285. Hamilton, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
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1106 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
corporation as a whole.286 Individual plaintiffs must show that the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff can succeed
without showing harm to the corporation.287 The requirement that the
plaintiff must succeed without showing harm to the corporation is integral
to individual lawsuits for rescission of contracts under § 47(b)(2). An
individual investor is more likely to show that he was harmed without
showing the investment company itself was harmed if the investor, not the
investment company, was a party to the contract. In essence, individual
investors suing on their own behalf have standing only if they can show a 
harm distinct from the harms that the investment company suffered as a
whole. A plaintiff can overcome the standing requirement if the plaintiff
is a party to the contract that violates the ICA.288 
In Hamilton v. Allen, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania’s decision embodied the restrictions standing
places on private plaintiffs seeking rescission under § 47(b)(2).289 In
Hamilton, the plaintiffs were two private investors who filed a class action
“on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated.”290 The
plaintiffs alleged the investment advisers failed to include the fund
investors in hundreds of securities class action lawsuits, thereby causing
financial loss to all investors in the mutual fund.291 Because of this failure,
the plaintiffs sought rescission of the advisory contracts entered into
between the mutual fund’s board of directors and the investment advisers
under § 47(b).292 The plaintiffs alleged the performance of the advisory
contracts violated § 36(a) and (b) of the ICA.293 
The court analyzed the plaintiffs’ standing and determined that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the claim.294 The claim was
derivative in nature because the officers and directors of the mutual fund
breached their fiduciary duty, harming all investors in the fund, not just
one specific class of investors.295 Massachusetts law, which was
286. PRACTICAL LAW LITIGATION, supra note 227.
287. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1039 (Del.
2004).
288. PRACTICAL LAW LITIGATION, supra note 227.
289. Hamilton, 396 F. Supp. 2d 545.
290. Id. at 548. The claim was a direct action, not a derivative action, because 
the plaintiffs brought a class action suit on behalf of all similarly situated investors




294. Id. at 559–60.
295. Id. at 551.
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2021] COMMENT 1107
controlling in this case, stated that if the alleged wrong harms the plaintiffs
merely as owners of corporate stock, then the harm is derivative in
nature.296 Hamilton exhibits a key principle that several courts have 
previously echoed: either the plaintiff must be a party to the contract, or
the plaintiff must bring a derivative suit on behalf of the fund to have
standing.297 The plaintiffs were not parties to the advisory contracts at
issue, and they did not bring a derivative claim on behalf of all
shareholders; therefore, the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring claims
under the ICA.298 If the plaintiffs would have brought a derivative suit, the
court would not have dismissed the claim.299 Because it is unlikely the
board of directors would sue the investment advisers, the derivative claim
would have been one in which demanding the board of directors bring suit
on behalf of the corporation was futile.300 In this case, it is unlikely that
the board would have sued the investment adviser on behalf of the harms
the investment adviser inflicted upon the company and its investors;
therefore, a derivative suit likely would have been warranted under these
facts.
2. Practical Implications of Standing
Standing greatly restricts the class of plaintiffs who can bring a private
right of action for rescission under § 47(b)(2). Under § 47(b)(2), private
investors may only seek rescission for violations of the ICA either
contained within the investment agreements they sign with investment
companies or for violations of the ICA that occur when the terms of the
agreement are carried out.301 For example, a mutual fund investor can only 
seek rescission based on a provision within the prospectus that violates or
296. Id. at 550.
297. Id. at 558; see also Lessler v. Little, 857 F.2d 866, 874 (1st Cir. 1988). In
Lessler, the court opined as follows:
Lessler is not a party to the Narragansett-Monarch contract, nor does his
complaint assert a derivative action on behalf of Narragansett, which is
a party. Lessler proceeds solely on his own behalf as a shareholder and
on behalf of others similarly situated. As our previous decisions have 
made clear, a shareholder such as Lessler lacks the standing to pursue on
his own claims properly belonging to the corporation.
Lessler, 857 F.2d at 874; see also In re Regions Morgan Keegan Secs., Derivative,
& ERISA Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 744, 762 (W.D. Tenn. 2010).
298. Hamilton, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 558.
299. See id.
300. See generally Hamilton, 396 F. Supp. 2d 545.
301. See supra note 297.
352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd  436 4/26/21  8:53 AM












   
 
 
   
  





   
   
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
     
    
   
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
    
1108 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
causes a violation of the ICA.302 The prospectus is the root from which a
private right of action for rescission stems; therefore, an exploration of the
contents of a normal prospectus will solidify the types of ICA violations
that could lead to the rescission of an investment contract. Legally, a
mutual fund prospectus must contain a mutual fund’s investment
objectives, investment strategies, investment risks, past performance,
distribution policy, fees and expenses, and fund management
information.303 
The investment objectives are the financial goals of the fund.304 The 
financial goals of the fund should determine the investments chosen to
achieve the outlined fund goals.305 Investment strategies speak to the 
method the fund uses to allocate and manage its resources to achieve its
investment objectives.306 The risk of investing affirmatively states the
level of risk associated with a fund as determined by the riskiness of the
stock chosen.307 The past performance section shows the mutual fund’s
economic performance in prior years.308 The distribution policy explains
how investors receive payment from the fund in various forms such as
capital gains, interest, and dividends, to name a few.309 Furthermore, the 
prospectus addresses the fees and expenses the fund charges.310 The fees
and expenses section includes fees charged under § 12(b)(1), which covers
distribution, marketing, and fund servicing.311 Section 12(b)(1) fees pay
for marketing and brokers who sell the shares.312 Covered in the section
on fees and expenses are the fees paid to investment advisers.313 Finally,
the prospectus provides information regarding fund management, such as
information about the investment adviser of the mutual fund.314 If the 
alleged ICA violation does not arise out of the prospectus’ terms or the
performance of those terms, then a court will not grant rescission unless
302. The prospectus is the legally binding contract between the mutual fund











313. Adam Hayes, Expense Ratio Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www
.investopedia.com/terms/e/expenseratio.asp [https://perma.cc/DK6G-JCQ8] (last
updated July 9, 2020).
314. Heyford, supra note 10.
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2021] COMMENT 1109
the private investor brings a derivative suit on behalf of the company.315 
Standing restricts the ability of individual plaintiffs to seek rescission of
contracts other than the prospectus because the investors are not parties to
such contracts. 
To illustrate a case in which a private right of action for rescission
could occur, recall the hypothetical involving Jordan Belfort, the
investment adviser of a mutual fund, and Chester, Donnie, and Nicky— 
the investors.316 In that example, the financial goals in the prospectus were 
conservative with modest, long-term objectives. Thus, the decision to
invest in S&P 500 stocks matched the prospectus’ objectives. Jordan’s
subsequent poor decision to invest in risky penny stocks for a quick short-
term gain did not match the fund objectives of modest, long-term growth. 
Jordan violated the terms of the prospectus and exposed the fund investors
to extreme risk for the self-serving purpose of increasing his salary, which
is directly tied to the performance of the fund. In this case, Chester, 
Donnie, and Nicky are parties to the prospectus, and Jordan has violated
§ 36(a) of the ICA.317 Jordan has breached the fiduciary duty he owed to
the mutual fund investors for a self-serving purpose. As a result of the
breach of fiduciary duty, Chester, Donnie, and Nicky have suffered
harm—Jordan has squandered the money they invested. Under this
scenario, Chester, Donnie, and Nicky would have standing to bring a suit
for rescission of their investment contracts under § 47(b)(2) of the ICA.318 
3. Equity and Severability Restrictions
In addition to the standing restriction, § 47(b)(2) states that “a court
may not deny rescission . . . unless such court finds that under the
circumstances, the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable
result than its grant, and would not be inconsistent with the purposes of
this title.”319 Section 47(b)(2) grants courts the power to decide if
rescission of investment contracts is equitable under the circumstances,
provided the denial of rescission is consistent with the purpose of the
ICA.320 Recall that the purpose of the ICA as set forth in the findings and 
315. See supra note 297; see also In re Regions Morgan Keegan Secs.,
Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 744, 762 (W.D. Tenn. 2010).
316. See supra Introduction.
317. Heyford, supra note 10.
318. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46 (2019). See generally Hamilton v. Allen, 396 F. Supp.
2d 545 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Lessler v. Little, 857 F.2d 866, 874 (1st Cir. 1988); In re 
Regions Morgan Keegan Secs., 743 F. Supp. 2d at 762.
319. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46.
320. See id.
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1110 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
declaration of policy section is to address the fraud and mismanagement
in the investment company industry with a particular focus on the conflict
of interest inherent in the relationship between the investment adviser and
mutual fund.321 The court should look to whether the ICA violation
amounted to mismanagement and fraud or whether the violation was
incidental or clerical.322 The ICA seeks to eliminate mismanagement and 
fraud within investment companies; therefore, technical violations of the
ICA will generally not lead to rescission on equity grounds. 323 
Finally, § 47(b)(3) restricts private causes of action for rescission to
the unlawful portion of the contract to the extent the contract is
severable.324 In pertinent part § 47(b)(3) states, “This subsection shall not
apply (A) to the lawful portion of a contract to the extent that it may be
severed from the unlawful portion of the contract . . . .”325 If the contract
can be severed, only the section of the investment contract that violates the 
ICA will be rescinded.326 State law governs the severability of contractual
provisions.327 Although state law varies somewhat regarding the
severability of contracts, a contract provision is generally severable if the
contract provides for multiple promises, each of which are separately
enforceable, such that failure of one of the promises does not cause the
breaching party to breach the entire contract.328 Section 47(b)(3) reduces
the financial risk rescission poses to investment companies because courts 
should restrict rescission to the section of the investment contract that
violates the ICA.329 Ultimately, the rescission of the entire investment
contract is unlikely.
CONCLUSION
Section 47(b)(2) provides investors with a private right of action for
rescission when the contract they sign or the performance thereof violates
the ICA, whether it is a mutual fund prospectus or a trust indenture.330 
Although mutual fund directors and investment advisers may view this
321. See Lessler, 857 F.2d at 870.
322. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46.
323. See id. § 80a–1.
324. Id. § 80a–46.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
328. Severable Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
329. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46.
330. Oxford Univ. Bank v. Lansuppe Feeder, LLC, 933 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.
2019); see 15 U.S.C. § 80a–46; Heyford, supra note 10.
352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd  439 4/26/21  8:53 AM




   
  




      




    
     
  
   
     
 







     
   
   
   
    
   
2021] COMMENT 1111
outcome as detrimental to the funds and investments they manage, the
overall increase in risk to investment companies is minimal because of
several key factors.331 A private plaintiff only has standing if the
investment contract itself violates the ICA, or if the plaintiff brings a
derivative action on behalf of the investment company.332 Additionally,
the equity provision in § 47(b)(2) and the severability provision in
§ 47(b)(3) both reduce the economic risks rescission poses to investment
companies.333 The limitations provided within the statute suggest
Congress contemplated the potential damage that widespread rescission of
investment contracts posed to investment companies and to the overall
health of the U.S. economy when they created § 47. Section 47’s
provisions both limit rescission when rescission would produce an
inequitable result and restrict rescission to the portion of the contract that
violates the ICA.334 
Recognizing a private right of action for rescission under § 47(b)(2), 
with its limitations in mind, adheres to the purpose of the ICA.335 
Recognition of a private right of action for rescission protects investors in
the face of inherent conflicts of interest between investment advisers and
the funds they manage, and such protection is a core tenet of the ICA.336 
Furthermore, the interests of a stable economy are protected through the
limitations placed on such a cause of action.




335. Id. § 80a–1.
336. Id.
